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Bond Funding of SMEs: An
Analysis of the Italian Case
Emanuele Rossi and Simone Boccaletti
Abstract
The chapter analyzes the financial policy of corporate bond issuers in the new
Italian junior bond market specifically dedicated to unlisted firms and SMEs, using a
proprietary firm-level dataset on 127 first-time mini-bond issuers across 2013–
2017 years jointly with a control sample of around 5200 Italian private firms that
have not issued corporate bonds across the same years. Since SME access to the debt
capital market is largely considered a valuable source of debt funding diversifica-
tion, especially for growth firms with a prominent exposure on bank debt, we test
using OLS regressions whether bond issuers are able to reduce their financial vul-
nerability in comparison with similar nonissuers firms. The aim is to assess the
extent to which the financial choices of SMEs regarding nonequity external funding
can become a key factor in facing real and financial shocks like those triggered by
the current pandemic Covid-19 outbreak. Our findings suggest that the access to the
junior bond market is beneficial for the Italian unlisted companies in terms of a
pronounced improvement in our financial fragility indicators.
Keywords: small business finance, bond financing, SMEs, financial fragility,
mini-bonds
JEL classification: G12, G23, G24, G32
1. Introduction
The pandemic Covid-19 outbreak has severely disrupted the economic systems
across European countries during the 2020 first semester. Widespread lockdowns
have brought to a halt for a few months the firms’ production and services deliver-
ing in many countries and major concerns have arisen on the capacity of many firms
to survive the real and financial shocks induced by the current pandemic. Despite
all governments and public authorities vast subsidizing programs deployed to help
economy recovery, still small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) remain partic-
ularly exposed to the negative consequences of the current Covid-19 outbreak due
to their higher perceived financial vulnerability.
Among European countries, Italy has been the first country to be harshly hit by
the coronavirus outbreak and one of the more exposed to negative economic con-
sequences of the pandemic. Moreover, its economic system is very much reliant on
SMEs on the economy supply side. Anecdotal evidence points out that many small
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businesses are struggling to re-open and resume their activities after the slow easing
up of the government lockdown measures.
Under these circumstances, the present study aims to test the financial policies
that Italian SMEs have developed across the years starting from the aftermath of the
2008 financial crisis and the ensuing 2011 Greek sovereign debt crisis, up to recent
years. There are many ways to deal with this issue and its many specifics. We opt to
focus on how SMEs in Italy have chosen to diversify their debt funding away from
bank lending through corporate bonds funding, since SME access to the debt capital
market is largely considered a valuable source of debt funding diversification,
especially for growth firms with a prominent exposure on bank debt [1–5]. Beyond
that, one of the main goals of a firm’s sound financial policy, particularly in the case
of SMEs, should be to devise financial choices that may help reducing the financial
vulnerability to potential unexpected financial shocks [6, 7].
There are several reasons for our research focus. First, it is well documented that
SMEs tend to be over-reliant on bank debt, especially short-term lending [8].
Second, the last global financial crisis heightened in southern European countries by
the spillover of Greek sovereign debt crisis in 2011 has produced a lasting credit
crunch propelled by risk aversion from banks and their concerns on borrowers
default risk, which it has been particularly severe for SMEs [9, 10]. Third, in order
to counter the negative effect of this credit crunch on SMEs, the Italian government
has promoted in June 2012 a raft of reforms in order to facilitate the SMEs and
unlisted firms’ access to bond financing1 [3]. A new junior bond market for mini-
bonds, named ExtraMot-Pro, within the domestic Borsa Italiana stock exchange, has
been launched in February 2013, with a set of soft requisites for SMEs issuers. In
brief, the new junior bond market is characterized by minimal regulations and
simplified admission requirements in comparison with those set up for the senior
corporate bond market.
More in particular, we analyze in this chapter whether mini-bond issuers have
improved their financial resilience thanks to this market-based financial choice
across the years between the two major recent crises (i.e., the 2011 Greek sovereign
crisis and the 2020 pandemic-induced crisis). By focusing on this topic, our study
may contribute to shed new light on the emerging debate on how small businesses
can recover from the current crisis triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic.
Our empirical analysis is performed using regression models based on a propri-
etary hand-collected dataset of 127 mini-bonds issued by nonfinancial firms across
2013–2017 years jointly with a sample of nearly 5200 Italian private firms that have
not issued corporate bonds across the same years. The dataset combines evidence on
mini-bonds issuers, collected from Borsa Italiana website and admission prospec-
tuses, with detailed financial statements data from Bureau Van Dijk’ Amadeus/Aida
dataset.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our research question
and the testable hypothesis. Section 3 describes our dataset and provides sample
description. Section 4 illustrates the research design and the empirical methodology.
Section 5 sets out the empirical results and discusses the main implications of the
study. Section 5 concludes the paper.
1 The regulatory framework for mini-bonds in Italy has been established by “Decreto Sviluppo” (D.L. n.
83, June 22, 2012), “Decreto Sviluppo Bis” (D.L. n. 179, October 18, 2012), “Piano Destinazione Italia”
(D.L. n. 145, December 23, 2013), “Decreto competitività” (D.L. n. 91, June 24, 2014). For further detail,
see the Borsa Italiana website: https://www.borsaitaliana.it/prolink/extramotpro/ilcontestonormativo/ilc
ontestonormativo.en.htm
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2. The financial fragility of SMEs: does corporate bond financing make
SMEs more resilient to potential crisis?
In our research setting, we are interested in testing one of the key ingredients
that normally shapes the firms’ financial policy [11, 12]: how firms’ external funding
choices could make them less financial fragile when facing potential unforeseen real
or financial shocks like those induced by the current coronavirus pandemic. The
basic idea, here, is the more the firm is less dependent from a unique or very few
sources of external funding (for instance, bank lending), the better for the firm
from a financial vulnerability point of view. We reckon that this topic is nowadays
extremely important in particular for SMEs, which are the firm size-class clearly
more at risk of survival in the current economic climate at least in those countries
most affected by the pandemic.
In order to tackle this issue we ask ourselves whether the choice of debt diversi-
fication away from bank lending can improve or not the firms’ financial fragility
and, thus makes them, at least on paper, more resilient to potential external finan-
cial shocks or crises.
Prior literature on SME access to debt capital market have focused on the
benefits that corporate bonds offers in terms of: positive management culture
change linked to the firm financial life-cycle when approaching market-based
finance [13]; enhanced market visibility on prospective investors [14–17]; acclima-
tization function and progressive step toward other more complex forms (even
equity) of capital market funding [18]; and, even, reduced financial costs on subse-
quent bank lending thanks to heightened bargaining power in the firm-bank rela-
tionships [19]. On the contrary, there is still less evidence on the role that corporate
bond financing may play on addressing the SMEs financial fragility issue. It is true
that, at least on paper, any opportunity of debt diversification may help small
businesses achieve a better and more balanced financial policy, but it is important
also to verify whether this goal is somehow supported by the empirical data as we
cannot take for granted that smaller firms are in practice able to improve their
financial resilience through this channel of funding since there can be the suspicion
that firms are replacing one form of debt (bank lending) with another one (debt
securities). This is a quite relevant question in the current economic climate domi-
nated by the pandemic crisis.
Ideally, to develop a comprehensive study on this research topic we should need a
large dataset across years of firms’ financial data around the crisis (in this case the
pandemic) both before and after the event. Since we can only source data before the
coronavirus outbreak, we are obliged to use firm-level data in the years before the
2020 pandemic crisis. We, thus, consider the firm’s choice of corporate bond funding
as the major external debt diversification solution molding the firm financial policy.
Under these circumstances, we formulate the following main research question.
Does corporate bond financing make SMEs more resilient to potential crisis? To
answer this research question we opt to create a firm-level financial fragility indi-
cator using core financial reports data both before and after the time of mini-bonds
funding for issuer firms and compute the variation reported by this indicator across
the years. The basic idea is that the difference between ex-post (after the bond
issuance) score and the ex-ante score (before the mini-bond funding) of our finan-
cial fragility indicator should give us a good proxy of the impact of the treatment
(the corporate bond funding) on the firm financial fragility and, thus, on the ability
of the firms’ financial policy to reach its desired outcome in terms of improved
(less) financial fragility.
Even if financial vulnerability can be measured along many dimensions, and
there is not always a wide consensus on how measure it, we are confident that our
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metric that include five different financial ratios commonly used by scholars and
practitioners in assessing firms’ financial health is reasonable robust. We then use
this indicator as our dependent variable in our regressions as depicted later in our
Section 4. Among the explanatory variables, together with other control variables,
we employ a mini-bond financing dummy which is equal to one in case of SME
funding through this channel and zero otherwise.
In this way, we can empirically test our main hypothesis on whether Italian
SMEs mini-bond issuers are able to reduce ex-post their financial vulnerability as a
consequence of this debt diversification choice in comparison with similar and
comparable nonissuer firms. In sum our hypothesis is the following:
H.: Italian SME mini-bond issuers that diversify their debt funding through the access
to the debt capital-market become ex-post less financial fragile.
If the above hypothesis is positively confirmed by our tests, we can claim that
corporate bond funding may prove to be a key ingredient of a firm’s sound financial
policy aiming to improve its financial resilience to potential unexpected financial
shocks, particularly in the case of SMEs.
3. Dataset and sample description
3.1 Dataset on Italian companies
Since we cannot test the counterfactual assumption of our hypothesis, i.e. what
could happen to the financial vulnerability of those issuers firms if they have not
chosen to access the debt capital market, we have to rely on a matched control
group of private firms that have not issued corporate bonds across the same years
under investigation. This control group is created from a large sample of around
6000 Italian firms extracted from Bureau Van Dijk’ Amadeus/Aida dataset (here-
after Amadeus).
Therefore, in order to analyze the role of corporate bond funding in changing
SMEs financial fragility, we have sourced data for two different samples. First, the
listed mini-bonds sample (i.e. issuers firms) and, second, the matched control group
sample formed by comparable private firms that have not issued mini-bonds
(nonissuers firms).
For the first sample, we source data on mini-bonds listed on the junior bond
market ExtraMot Pro, from its starting date in 2013 up to the end of December
2017. We obtained from the Borsa Italiana website the raw information on listed
bonds and its issuers on the 15th January 2020. The total number of bonds net of
delisting is 241, from 160 different firms. We consider only first time issuers, so we
eliminate subsequent bond offerings from the same firm, since the decision to
access the capital market could be persistent across time, following the standard
approach used in the going public literature, dating back to the seminal work of
Pagano et al. [20]. Then, we match the obtained dataset with accounting informa-
tion about the issuers, collected from the Amadeus database. Due to a lack of
complete accounting information for some issuers, the dataset comprises 127 mini-
bonds issued by nonfinancial companies.We consider only nonfinancial firm
issuers because financial statements information for financial and nonfinancial
companies are not easily comparable.
As regards our control group, we source from the same Amadeus database a
subset of nearly 40,000 private Italian nonfinancial firms with a number of
employees between 1 and 2000 units, total asset between 0.3 and 1500 €/million,
and with at least 5 years of available accounting data across the years where we have
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corporate bonds offerings. From this large dataset, we randomly draw 1200
nonissuing firms’ observation, with a comparable size of the issuers’ firms, for each
year of mini-bond issuance (from 2013 up to 2017). In this way, we are able to
match issuers in a given year with a control group randomly drawn for the same
year. Hence, the final raw control group is composed by 6000 firms. However, due
to lack of some relevant accounting information, our final sample consists of 5319
firms (127 issuers and 5192 from the control group).
For what concerns firm-level accounting data for constructing our dependent
and independent variables, we collect for the two firms’ samples not only ex-ante
data, (i.e. before the time of bond funding for issuers and the same year for the
matched control group) but also data of 2 years after. For example, for mini-bond
issuers that first-time entered the debt capital market during the 2017, we have
collected financial statements data for the years 2016 and 2019. For a firm in the
control group, the procedure is the same: if the firm is drawn in the 2017 sub-
sample, we collected data for the years 2016 and 2019. In this way, we have
homogeneous data between the issuers sample and the control group.
3.2 Sample descriptive characteristics
Our corporate bond issuers sample, which is composed by 127 offerings, is
depicted in Table 1 which illustrates the distribution of issuers by size (in terms of
sales) using the firms’ financial reports from themost recent year prior to the issuance
date. In accordance with the standard EU Commission definition, we define a SME as
a firm with fewer than 250 employees, total assets lower than €43 million, or sales
lower than €50 million. A small firm is defined as a firm with fewer than 50
employees, total assets lower than €10 million, or sales lower than €10 million.
Table 1 distribution highlights that SMEs cover around 49% of our sample (i.e.
first two size classes). Table 2 shows the distributions of issuer firms by industry.
The majority of these bonds were issued by manufacturing firms, followed by the
retail sector. The positive correlation between issuers’ size and mini-bond capital
raised is confirmed in Table 3. As a matter of fact, larger bonds are issued by
unlisted firms with more than 50 €/million sales. For SMEs with sales under the 50
€/million threshold, the average capital raised remains quite low. Table 4 displays
the issuance motivations as declared in the bonds prospectuses, and highlights that
the main use of proceeds of the mini-bond funding is to exploit growth opportuni-
ties but still debt restructuring and diversification of funding are acknowledged by a
high percentage (around 23%) of issuers, behind supporting firms’ growth target.
Table 5 divides our sample into four groups according to the issuer-size in order to
Size class # of observation frequency
<10 million 12 9.45%
Between 10 and 50 million 50 39.37%
Between 50 and 100 million 18 14.17%
>100 million 47 37.01%
Total 127 100.00%
The sample is split accordingly to four different size classes based on sales in €/million. The table shows the number of
the observations and the percentage with respect to the total for each category. Our elaboration on proprietary dataset.
Table 1.
Issuers distribution by size class.
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provide a more detailed examination of the issuers’ characteristics through selected
financial ratios. It is useful to highlight that smaller issuers are more leveraged, but,
interestingly, have a higher interest coverage ratio (the ratio between EBITDA and
interest expenses) and EBITDA over sales with respect to larger firms, while asset
tangibility (as measured as tangible fixed asset over total assets) is, as expected,
lower. Lastly, Table 6 exhibits the differences in key financial ratios between the
control group and minibond-issuers. The two samples present strong similarities in
terms of size and profitability (i.e. ROI), which can guarantee us a good fit of our
control group. On the other hand, issuers are overall more indebted, and in partic-
ular to banks. This evidence confirms that the use of mini-bond funding is aimed to
exploit growth opportunities when bank lending is particularly costly and/or
rationed, or to diversify the funding sources.
Sector # of observation Frequency
Accommodation and catering 2 1.57%
Agriculture, silviculture and fishing 2 1.57%
Arts, sports and entertainment 2 1.57%
Buildings and constructions 7 5.51%
Energy 5 3.94%
Health and social care 2 1.57%
ICT 7 5.51%
Manufacturing 54 42.52%
Professional and scientific activities 8 6.30%
Real estate 2 1.57%
Rental and travels 6 4.72%
Retail activities 16 12.60%
Transports and storing 3 2.36%
Water, sewer and waste 11 8.66%
Total 127 100.00%
The number of firms and the frequencies are displayed. Our elaboration on proprietary dataset.
Table 2.
Issuer distribution across sectors, using the ATECO 2007 classifications.
Size class Average issue Total volume Total volume (%)
<10 million 11.80 141.58 3.17%
Between 10 and 50 million 6.17 308.33 6.90%
Between 50 and 100 million 14.89 267.45 5.98%
>100 million 79.88 3754.16 83.96%
Total 35.21 4471.52 100%
Principal capital raised, by issuers size class. The table depicts the average capital raised and the total volume of
principal capital for the four issuers size classes. Values are displayed in €/million. Our elaboration on proprietary
dataset.
Table 3.
Issues’ volume (€/millions), by issuers’ size classes.
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4. Research design and methodology
4.1 Empirical method
In order to study whether the access to the mini-bond market reduces firms’
financial fragility, we perform a set of OLS regression models using the pooled
sample of issuers and nonissuers of mini-bonds across the years analyzed
Category D/E
Ratio
Bank
debt
exposure
Interest
coverage
Short-term
bank debt
ratio
Current
ratio
ROI EBITDA/
Sales
Tangible
ratio
<10 million 2.61 34.82% 17.85 16.85% 1.15 6.6 23.03% 21.00%
4.73 29.28% 37.07 17.53% 0.42 10.16 34.92% 27.51%
Between 10
and 50 million
2.53 50.39% 7.91 26.78% 1.22 8.13 14.56% 27.28%
2.52 18.30% 13.20 13.50% 0.51 6.78 10.13% 24.53%
Between 50
and 100
million
2.18 45.16% 6.06 26.58% 1.06 10.19 12.79% 20.33%
1.4 15.06% 9.14 14.77% 0.17 8.81 9.40% 19.75%
>100 million 1.58 43.49% 5.96 25.04% 1.17 8.77 12.36% 25.45%
2.21 18.25% 4.70 15.86% 0.44 7.53 8.45% 18.81%
Total 2.14 45.62% 7.71 25.16% 1.17 8.55 14.30% 25.02%
2.58 19.47% 14.08 15.06% 0.44 7.64 13.90% 22.11%
Issuers’ descriptive statistics. The table reports selected financial ratios for issuers, divided into four size classes (in terms
of sales). Means and standard deviations (in italics) are reported. D/E Ratio is the issuer’s debt to equity ratio; Bank
debt exposure is the ratio between the bank debt to total debt. The interest coverage ratio is the ratio between the issuer’s
EBITDA and its interest expenses. The short-term bank debt ratio is the ratio between bank short term debt and total
debt. The current ratio is the ratio between issuer’s current assets and current liabilities. Tangible asset ratio is the ratio
between tangible fixed assets and total assets. Our elaboration on proprietary dataset.
Table 5.
Selected financial ratios by issuers’ size class.
Motivation # of observation Frequency
Support working capital 20 10.10%
Growth 84 42.42%
Exploit merge/acquisition opportunity 13 6.57%
Internationalization 22 11.11%
Debt restructuring/diversification of funding 45 22.73%
Not declared/unavailable 14 7.07%
Total 198 100%
Motivations declared by issuers in the bond prospectuses. This table shows the motivations reported in the bond
prospectus, divided into 5 main categories: Supporting the working capital, growth, exploit M&A opportunity,
internationalization, debt restructuring or diversification of funding. The number of declared use of proceeds exceeds
the number of issuers due to the fact that some issuers have declared more than one use of proceeds.
Table 4.
Use of proceeds.
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(2013–2017). This methodology has often been employed in the prior going public
literature, starting from the Pagano et al. study [20], on IPOs equity markets.
We choose as the dependent variable a measure of financial fragility (or vulner-
ability) using an equally weighted basket of financial ratios that aims to capture the
exposure of the firm to the negative consequences of potential real and financial
shocks.
In the OLS regressions, we estimate beta coefficients using a proxy of financial
fragility as the dependent variable and combinations of the explanatory variables
for different specifications, as depicted in the next section. More in detail, we
compute the variation in the score of our financial fragility indicator for each firm
between 2 years after the event (the corporate bond issuance) and the year before
the same event. When the difference is positive, it means that our proposed finan-
cial fragility metric has worsened (becoming higher), the opposite if the difference
is negative.
The basic structure of our regressions is as follows:
ΔFinFragility ¼ αþ β1 Minibondð Þi,t þ
X
k
γkFirmControlsi,t1 þ ϵ, (1)
whereMinibondi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 in case of mini-bond funding of
firm i at time t and zero otherwise, and FirmControlsi,t1 is a vector of firm-specific
Variable Issuers Control sample
Sales (Natural logarithm) 17.69 18.05
1.68 1.06
D/E Ratio 2.14 1.46
2.58 3.53
Bank debt exposure 45.62% 29.72%
19.47% 23.81%
Interest coverage 7.71 24.77
14.08 46.68
Short-term bank debt ratio 25,17% 20.31%
15.06% 19.42%
Current ratio 1.17 1.42
0.44 0.75
ROI 8.55 8.65
7.64 7.81
EBITDA/Sales 14.30% 7.37%
13.90% 8.45%
Tangible ratio 25.02% 19.22%
22.11% 17.79%
# of observation 127 5192
Difference between the issuers’ sample and the control group. Standard deviations are reported in italics. Size is
measured by the natural logarithm of sales. D/E Ratio is the issuer’s debt to equity ratio; Bank debt exposure is the
ratio between the bank debt to total debt. The interest coverage ratio is the ratio between the issuer’s EBITDA and its
interest expenses. The short-term bank debt ratio is the ratio between bank short term debt and total debt. The current
ratio is the ratio between issuer’s current assets and current liabilities. Tangible ratio is the ratio between tangible fixed
assets and total assets.
Table 6.
Differences between the two samples (issuers and nonissuers).
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control variables about the issuers and nonissuers characteristics using the last
available accounting information at the date of the bond offering. We control for
sector and time fixed effects.
4.2 Dependent and explanatory variables
As indicated previously, our dependent variable is the change in firms’ financial
fragility, and it portrays the exposure of the firms to the negative consequences to
potential financial shocks. We build a measure of financial fragility (or vulnerability)
using an equally weighted scoring indicator of five financial ratios that capture the
most significant dimensions of firms’ financial health. They are the following:
interest coverage financial ratio; current ratio; short-term bank debt over total debt;
financial leverage (i.e. debt to equity ratio), bank debt exposure (bank debt over
total debt). The procedure is the ensuing: for each year and for each five financial
ratio we create a ranking system starting from a score of 1 (lowest financial fragility)
up to 5 (highest financial fragility) based on a quintile classification of the financial
ratio (we used also different ranking criteria, but our empirical results remain robust
and are not affected significantly). For example, for year 2016 we have a starting
sample of 28 mini-bond issuers and 1200 firms in the control group. Then, for each
financial ratio we compute the score for all firms. Then, we compute the financial
fragility indicator for all firms by computing the average of all 5 scores (with equal
weights).
Next, we calculate the difference of the score of the financial fragility indicator
between t + 2 and t 1, relative to the reference year. We think that a two-year time
span after the event is a good compromise in order to assess the effect of the firms’
financial policy choices on the desired outcomes in terms of better financial resil-
ience. Longer event windows (up to 3 year after the event or more) have undesired
features such as: the loss of a significant number of observations in our issuers
sample since for mini-bond issued during 2017 we do not have a 3 year ex-post track
record of financial reports; and the longer the time horizon the more the effects on
our financial fragility indicator can be influenced by other factors than merely the
financial policy choice under scrutiny. Table 7 shows the differences in the average
financial fragility indicator score for the two sub-samples. As a matter of fact, mini-
bond issuers have a higher average score because they are more leveraged, more
indebted to banks and have a lower interest coverage with respect to the control
group.
Variable Issuers Control sample Total
Before t0 3.91 3.2 3.21
0.64 0.98 0.98
After t0 3.73 3.12 3.14
0.62 0.93 0.93
Difference 0.18*** 0.07*** 0.07***
0.63 0.58 0.58
# of observation 127 5192 5319
Financial fragility scores for the two samples before and after the bond issuance date. Standard deviations are reported
in italics. T0 is the event year of bond issuance for both samples. Values are average scores of the financial fragility
indicator that spans from a score of 1 (lowest financial fragility) to a score of 5 (highest financial fragility). Stars
denote the standard level of p-value significance: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. Our elaboration on proprietary dataset.
Table 7.
Differences in the financial fragility average score.
9
Financial Fragility and Corporate Bond Funding of SMEs: An Analysis of the Italian Case
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.93701
As far as concerned the explanatory variables, we introduce a mini-bond finan-
cial dummy variable (MiniBond) which is equal to one in case of mini-bond funding
of firm i at time t and zero otherwise. Beyond that, we consider a selection of
firm-specific control variables: firm size (as log of total asset), profitability
(measured as the EBITDA on sales), tangibility (measured as tangible fixed assets
over total assets), and book value of equity over fixed assets ratio as a measure of
firms’ asset-liability mismatch. We introduce also two size dummies, a SME and a
Small dummy variable, that controls for the issuers’ classification according to EU
Commission standard definition as a SME (Small) or not. SMEs are naturally
opaque firms and obtain funds almost exclusively through private equity and
bank debt [13]. In general, the informational asymmetry issue may cause shortage
of finance and credit rationing and may lead to a disparity in access to bond
financing between SMEs and large firms [21, 22]. The dummy size variables aim
to test whether is actually more difficult for private SMEs or smaller firm to
improve their financial resilience. Appendix A summarizes and describes our
firm-specific variables that we have used in the regressions, while Tables 8 and 9,
report the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for the empirical
variables, respectively.
5. Empirical results
Table 10 shows the outcomes of our regressions, in which the beta coefficients
and standard errors (in italics) are displayed. The effect of the mini-bond financing
dummy on the change reported in the score of the financial fragility indicator 2
years after the event is negative and highly statistically significant (at the 5 percent
level). Thus, the access to the debt capital market is conducive for the Italian
companies to a decrease in the financial fragility after the event relative to the same
indicator value displayed before this relevant change in their financial policy previ-
ously adopted. Consequently, our research hypothesis is confirmed.
As regards the other firm-specific control variables, we note that the tangibility
variable displays a statistically significant (at 1 percent level) negative beta
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max obs
ΔFinFragility 0.075 0.583 3.4 2.6 5319
Minibond 0.024 0.152 0 1 5319
Tangible ratio 0.194 0.179 0.001 0.983 5319
EBITDA/Sales 7.55% 8.69% 19.36% 99% 5319
Asset-liability mismatch 8.713 18.201 0.017 76 5319
Size 19.691 1.232 12.638 22.777 5319
SME 30.28% 49.86% 0 1 5319
Small 5.41% 22.61% 0 1 5319
Descriptive statistics of the pooled sample variables. ΔFinFragility is the difference in the financial fragility indicator
between t + 2 and t  1; Minibond is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm issued minibond at t0; Tangible ratio is
the ratio between the tangible fixed assets and the total assets. EBITDA/Sales is the ratio between EBITDA and Sales;
the asset liability mismatch variable is the book value of equity over fixed assets ratio; size is the natural logarithm of
total assets; SME (Small) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a SME (Small) as defined in appendix A.
Table 8.
Variables’ descriptive statistics.
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ΔFinFragility Minibond Tangible ratio EBITDA/Sales Asset-liability mismatch Size SME Small
ΔFinFragility 1.00
Minibond 0.0284 1.00
Tangible ratio 0.0871 0.0493 1.00
EBITDA/Sales 0.0029 0.1210 0.3055 1.00
Asset-liability mismatch 0.0428 0.0223 0.4125 0.0223 1.00
Size 0.0945 0.0622 0.3201 0.3528 0.1249 1.00
SME 0.0404 0.0606 0.2672 0.2907 0.1182 0.7613 1.00
Small 0.0555 0.0156 0.1413 0.0990 0.0811 0.4259 0.2583 1.00
Correlation coefficients of the variables used in the OLS regressions. ΔFinFragility is the difference in the financial fragility indicator between t + 2 and t  1; Minibond is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
firm issued minibond at t0; Tangible ratio is the ratio between the tangible fixed assets and the total assets. EBITDA/Sales is the ratio between EBITDA and Sales; the asset liability mismatch variable is the
book value of equity over fixed assets ratio; size is the natural logarithm of total assets; SME (Small) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a SME (Small) as defined in appendix A.
Table 9.
Correlation coefficients.
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coefficient implying that the firms that presents higher tangible asset at the event
date are more able to reduce their financial vulnerability. Here, our results suggest
that SMEs with more intangible assets tends to develop, ceteris paribus, a more
fragile financial structure and this it is happened even before the current pandemic
crisis. We reckon that this is an interesting result as it shows that the presence of
consistent tangible assets not only offers a wider scope for pledging collateral to
potential investors playing a mitigating role regarding the borrower default risk
[23, 24] but it can also be helpful to reduce the financial fragility.
Size variables presents a mixed picture. On one hand, in the specification 1 in
which size is measured as log of total asset, we have a statistically negative coeffi-
cient showing that size as expected matters: the larger the firm the better its
financial resilience. On the other hand, when we consider more in detail the two
Dependent variabile: ΔFinFragility
Specification: 1 2 3 4
Minibond 0.115** 0.117** 0.118** 0.118**
0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056
Tangible ratio 0.273*** 0.274*** 0.290*** 0.282***
0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054
EBITDA/Sales 0.238 0.219 0.188 0.190
0.137 0.137 0.135 0.135
Asset-liability mismatch 0,0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
Size 0.028* 0.017
0.013 0.013
SME 0.074*** 0.066** 0.036* 0.043**
0.026 0.026 0.019 0.019
Small 0.095* 0.117**
0.047 0.045
Constant 0.554 0.335 0.029 0.030
0.367 0.372 0.281 0.280
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
R squared 0.045 0.046 0.044 0.046
#obs 5319 5319 5319 5319
Outcome of the OLS Regressions with four different specification. The dependent variable is the difference of the
financial fragility indicator between t + 2 and t  1. Minibond is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm issued
minibond at t0; Tangible ratio is the ratio between the tangible fixed assets and the total assets. EBITDA/Sales is the
ratio between EBITDA and Sales; the asset liability mismatch variable is the book value of equity over fixed assets
ratio; size is the natural logarithm of total assets; SME (Small) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a SME
(Small) as defined in appendix A. In all specifications industries dummies and year dummies are included. Beta
coefficients and robust standard errors (in italics) are displayed. Stars denote the standard level of p-value
significance.
*=10%.
**=5%.
***=1%.
Table 10.
OLS regressions on financial fragility.
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size dummies (SME e Small), the former has a negative coefficient implying that,
inside the small-medium size class, the larger firms are still less vulnerable from a
financial point of view. On the contrary, the Small dummy in all regression specifi-
cations changes beta coefficient sign and becomes positive and statistically signifi-
cant indicating that smaller firms (i.e. firms with sales lower that 10 million euro)
tends to worsen across time their financial fragility score. This result is not totally
unexpected as smaller firms are fundamentally less financial resilient as showed by
substantial prior literature [5, 25] and by the anecdotal evidence. Other control
variables such as, for instance, profitability are not statistically significant.
Even if our findings are quite robust, we must be aware that our study is limited
to a firm-level dataset which is confined to the years up to the coronavirus outbreak
and we cannot include in our tests the actual effects on firm financial data of the
current global pandemic. Therefore, our results must be read with great caution as it
is highly probable that the current crisis may display asymmetric effects across
countries, geographical areas and industries that are not reflected in our dataset.
Future researches based on new post-pandemic data can fully address this void.
6. Concluding remarks
The goal of our study is to contribute to shed new light on the emerging debate
on how small businesses can recover from the current crisis triggered by the Covid-
19 pandemic. Since SME access to the debt capital market is widely viewed as a
valuable source of firm debt diversification, especially for growth firms with a
prominent exposure on bank debt, we test whether SME bond issuers are able to
reduce their financial vulnerability thanks to this financial policy. The aim is to
assess the extent to which SMEs financial choices regarding nonequity external
funding can become a key factor in facing real and financial shocks like those
triggered by the current Covid-19 pandemic.
Our empirical analysis has been performed using OLS regression models based
on a proprietary hand-collected dataset of 127 first-time mini-bonds issuers across
2013–2017 years jointly with a control sample of around 5200 Italian private firms
that have not issued corporate bonds across the same years.
Based on our empirical analysis we find a robust evidence on the role that
corporate bond financing can play on addressing the SMEs financial fragility issue.
Debt diversification away from bank lending helps smaller firms to achieve a more
balanced and sound financial policy and, thus in turn, firms are able to improve
their financial resilience through this channel of funding. We think that this cir-
cumstance is becoming more and more relevant in the current economic climate
dominated by the adverse effects on SMEs of the global pandemic crisis. Corporate
bond funding offers benefits for SMEs that are not merely confined to what previ-
ous literature has already described such as: (a) hastening a more capital market-
oriented management culture linked to the firm life-cycle; (b) enhanced market
visibility on prospective investors; (c) providing an acclimatization function and a
platform for progressive steps toward other more complex forms (even equity) of
capital market funding; and (d) reduced costs on subsequent bank lending thanks
to heightened bargaining power in the firm-bank relationships.
As a matter of fact, we offer empirical evidence that corporate bond financing
has reduced the financial fragility of Italian SMEs. For these reasons, we can expect
that even after the pandemic outbreak the mini-bond funding channel may still play
a key, and maybe even enhanced, role in order to overcome the negative conse-
quences of the current financial climate for SMEs where firms will be probably
more and more indebted and more reliant on bank lending. Although our study is
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limited to the Italian unlisted firm context, we reckon that our findings can provides
useful insights to other countries particularly considering that the economic effects
of the current pandemic have been so pervasive.
Appendix A: variables’ definitions
Variable
name
Definition Source Notes
ΔFinFragility Difference between the
financial fragility indicator
at t + 2 and the financial
fragility indicator at t  1
Self-constructed from
financial ratios from
Amadeus—Bureau
van Dijk database
See section 4.2
Minibond Minibond dummy variable Borsa Italiana website Equal to 1 if the firm issued
mini-bond, zero otherwise
Tangible
ratio
Tangible ratio is the ratio
between the tangible fixed
assets and the total assets
Amadeus—Bureau
van Dijk database
EBITDA/
Sales
The ratio between EBITDA
and sales
Amadeus—Bureau
van Dijk database
Asset-
liability
mismatch
The book value of equity
over fixed assets ratio
Amadeus—Bureau
van Dijk database
A level below 1 of the ratio
indicates a mismatch
Size Natural log of Total Assets Amadeus—Bureau
van Dijk database
SME SME dummy variable Self-constructed Equal to 1 if the firm employees
are less than 250 and total asset
less than € 43 million and sales
lower than € 50 million, zero
otherwise
Small Small dummy variable Self-constructed Equal to 1 if the firm employees
are less than 50 and total asset
and sales less than €10 million,
zero otherwise
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